CAMBRIDGE – Even before voters in the United Kingdom decided in June to “Brexit” the European Union, notes Anatole Kaletsky
of Gavekal Dragonomics, German Chancellor Angela Merkel was widely
credited with “finally answering Henry Kissinger’s famous question about
the Western alliance: ‘What is the phone number for Europe?’”
Brexit
merely confirmed the point: UK Prime Minister Theresa May’s first
foreign trip after replacing David Cameron in July was to Berlin. If
Merkel has the power to mold the relationship between the EU and the UK,
as May appears to believe, she also has the power to shape the
post-Brexit EU.
The question is what type of Europe Germany wants. For Princeton University’s Harold James,
“Brexit means Germany can no longer rely on its liberal, more
market-oriented ally around the discussion table.” But Kaletsky wonders
whether Germany wants to discuss much of anything at all. “If Europe’s
phone number has a German dialing code,” he quips, “it goes through to
an automated answer: ‘Nein zu Allem.’”
But
Europe can no longer afford what Kaletsky describes as “the standard
German response to all economic initiatives aimed at strengthening
Europe.” As many Project Syndicate commentators point out,
Europe’s global influence depends on further integration. And that is
impossible without determined German leadership, which may now be hard
to find. Indeed, with “public support for the government…” having
“fallen below 50%,” Michael Bröning of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung wonders if Merkel will even seek “reelection as her party’s candidate for another term.”
Europe’s Civilizing Mission
To
understand what almost unchallenged German leadership in Europe could
mean for the EU and the world requires a sober grasp of how Germans
themselves view Europe and their role in it. And many Germans have come
to consider the EU a burden, not a benefit; the other member states,
they increasingly believe, want to squeeze ever more money out of them.
But
the truth is that Germany has been one of the biggest winner over the
past seven decades of European unification, both economically and
politically. As Joschka Fischer,
a former German foreign minister, put it in 2015, Germany restored its
reputation after World War II by “embracing Western integration and
Europeanization.” Because “Bismarck’s unification of Germany [occurred]
in the nineteenth century,” he explains, “power became inextricably
associated with nationalism and militarism.”
What
Fischer calls “the foundation of the second, unified German
nation-state in 1989” reflected and reinforced a very different mindset.
For Anne-Marie Slaughter,
President of New America and a former director of policy planning at
the US State Department, today’s Germany accepts that increased power
will require it to assume “greater responsibility to defend and extend”
the international order from which it has benefited so greatly. She
quotes German President Joachim Gauck: the post-World War II order gave
rise to the “good Germany, the best we have ever known.”
Yet
Fischer fears that the lessons of European integration are being lost
in the avalanche of crises that has hit the EU, with the Greek debt
crisis catalyzing German disillusionment. In the fraught negotiations at
the height of the crisis, he says, Germany “announced its desire to
transform the eurozone from a European project into a kind of sphere of
influence.” Germany no longer wanted “more Europe; it wanted less.”
Of
course, the contrast between a “European Germany” and a “German Europe”
is not new. In 2013, after Merkel was reelected, James noted
that “independent German political units” have been disappearing ever
since the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia. “If Germany’s new government leads
the charge toward a stronger, more federal Europe,” he suggested, “a
century from now, there may well be no sovereign German political unit
at all. Germany and its lovers die in the end, only to live happily ever
after.”
Perhaps.
In the meantime, Brexit, together with Merkel’s decision to admit more
than a million migrants from Syria and elsewhere in the greater Middle
East (partly to repair the reputational damage Germany suffered as a
result of its stance toward Greece), has made Germany’s choice both
clearer and more urgent. Germany can either regard Europe as a
projection of German power politics, as it did in the first half of the
twentieth century, or it can fulfill the post-1945 goal of
self-dissolution into a truly European federal entity.
The Arrogance of Reform
Immediate
political factors aside, the question of Germany’s role in Europe stems
from its economic dominance. During the eurozone crisis, many decried
Germany’s current-account surplus, not Greek profligacy, as the true
cause of the Union’s problems. But, as Harvard’s Kenneth Rogoff
argues, “Germans view the maintenance of strong balance sheets as
essential to their country’s stabilizing role in Europe.” Take one away,
and you may be left without the other.
Ironically, as Daniel Gros,
Director of the Brussels-based Centre for European Policy Studies,
reminds us, at the start of the century, it was Germany that was the
sick man of Europe. “Its economy was mired in recession, while the rest
of Europe was recovering; its unemployment rate was higher than the
eurozone average; it was violating the European budget rules by running
excessive deficits; and its financial system was in crisis.” Through
austerity and structural reforms, Germany transformed itself.
Little
wonder, then, that Germans counsel others to follow their example. But,
as Gros points out, this story is only half right. After all, Germany
has gained little in terms of productivity. Marcel Fratzscher,
formerly of the European Central Bank, together with Jürgen Fitschen of
Deutsche Bank and Reiner Hoffmann of the Confederation of German Trade
Unions, assert that a “key reason for this lackluster performance is
Germany’s notoriously paltry investment rate, which is among the lowest
in the OECD.” They note that, “since 1999, the largest German
multinationals have doubled their employee headcounts abroad, while
cutting jobs at home.”
The
euro’s introduction certainly helped Germany regain some
competitiveness, but Gros points to an often-overlooked factor:
“persistently high unemployment forced workers to accept lower wages and
longer working hours, while wages continued to increase by 2-3% per
year in the eurozone’s booming peripheral countries.” German gains in
competitiveness, then, are relative, and subsequently Germany has
obliged Spain and Greece – but not Italy – to undertake reforms much
harsher than those it ever imposed on itself.
Many
economists now urge Germany to boost wages and demand to help exporters
in Greece and other countries on the eurozone periphery. German firms
might complain, but Dalia Marin,
Chair of International Economics at the University of Munich, thinks
that the “most important factor behind Germany’s success” is not price
competitiveness, but quality. Because “German exporters are organized in
a way that is less hierarchical and more decentralized than other
European firms,” she argues, “employees at lower levels of the corporate
hierarchy” can “devise and implement new ideas.” And, because “these
employees are often closer to customers than those higher up, their
collective knowledge about what the market is demanding is an important
source of value.”
But it is unclear that periphery countries would benefit from higher German demand. As Gros argued
in 2013, Germany is “just the tip of a Teutonic iceberg.” Beneath the
surface, “the Netherlands, Switzerland, Sweden, and Norway are all
running surpluses that are larger as a proportion of GDP.” Given that
Germany imports relatively little from the eurozone periphery, higher
German demand would mainly benefit countries that already have large
external surpluses.
Does this mean that the German growth model should be ignored – in Europe and elsewhere? Harvard’s Dani Rodrik
notes that countries such as India and Turkey (as well as many in
Africa and in the former Soviet bloc) have proved that growth can also
be debt-led. And, as Gros points out, the “Teutonic” surplus is
currently balanced by “Anglo-Saxon” dissaving: “Together, the sum of the
current-account deficits of the United States, the United Kingdom, and
major Commonwealth countries amounts to more than $800 billion, or
roughly 60% of the global total of all external deficits.” This helps to
explain Merkel’s eagerness to maintain a close trading partnership with
the UK.
The Ordoliberal Straitjacket
The University of California at Berkeley’s Barry Eichengreen
traces Germany’s deep-seated “ideological aversion to budget deficits”
to “the post-World War II doctrine of ‘ordoliberalism,’” championed most
effectively by Ludwig Erhard as German finance minister in the 1950s
and Chancellor in the mid-1960s. According to Eichengreen,
ordoliberalism, which “counseled that government should enforce
contracts and ensure adequate competition but otherwise avoid
interfering in the economy,” succeeded in preventing “German
policymakers from being tempted by excesses like those of Hitler and
Stalin.” And yet its “emphasis on personal responsibility” ruled out
“the idea that actions that are individually responsible do not
automatically produce desirable aggregate outcomes.” As a result, “it
rendered Germans allergic to macroeconomics.”
But, as James points out,
ordoliberalism was a response to Germany’s need for “a complete change
of its domestic regime to break out of its cycle of debt and default.”
That experience, he argues, informs Germany’s approach to the eurozone
in general, and to its highly indebted member countries in particular:
“without a fundamental reorientation of a country’s politics, the
thinking in Germany goes, debt forgiveness will always remain a futile
exercise.”
Jürgen Jeske, a former publisher of the newspaper Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,
questions the sincerity of that thinking. Germany’s “current economic
dominance,” Jeske argues, “has been built on a policy framework that
stands in direct opposition to” Erhard’s doctrine, which he adamantly
defends. The truth, according to Jeske, is that Merkel’s government has
abandoned ordoliberalism in favor of an economic strategy that “has been
haphazard, driven more by political expediency than by any underlying
philosophy.” As a result, “Germany’s policymakers seem to be stumbling
from decision to decision” and “reacting with no clear sense of
direction to the demands of the moment.”
Defending Europe
Some
fear that Germany’s foreign policy has become similarly two-faced.
Slaughter is convinced that Germany remains a pillar of the West in
terms of its allegiance to NATO and European unity. She cites a high-level report,
“the product of several months of debate within the German
foreign-policy and security community,” which “identifies Germany’s
current values and interests as a commitment to ‘human dignity, freedom,
democracy, the rule of law, and to an international order that is based
on universal norms.’”
But Yuriko Koike,
Tokyo’s newly elected Governor, is not so confident. She fears that the
scale of Germany’s economic ties with Russia and China is injecting a
form of “stealth neutralism” into the country’s diplomacy.
Indeed,
Germany happily relied on the UK to take a tough stance against Russia
after its annexation of Crimea and incursion into eastern Ukraine. Now,
the UK’s departure may clear the way for a new Ostpolitik with Russia. As German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier suggested recently, “we should heed the lesson of détente: however deep the rifts, we must try to build bridges.”
Nonetheless, Europe, Steinmeier wrote
last year, “remains the foundation of Germany’s foreign policy,” and
that “Germany is capable of acting effectively” to shape global
developments “only within a solid European framework.” Likewise, Wolfgang Ischinger,
a former German ambassador and current head of the Munich Security
Conference, argued well before the Brexit vote that “Germany has an
opportunity to provide a counterweight to long-standing British
objections” against a more integrated European Foreign and Defense
Policy. “By putting its considerable influence in the service of a
cohesive, strategically focused foreign and security policy,” Ischinger
argued, “Germany would simultaneously achieve two key objectives: a
stronger and more capable EU and a more European Germany.”
Slaughter
takes this view a step further. She calls for a “deepening” of the EU
“through measures that would include democratizing EU financial
decision-making by directly engaging national parliamentarians and
exchanging tighter European fiscal constraints on member governments’
budgets for a European banking union, a eurozone budget, and Eurobonds.”
All of these ideas are of course currently anathema. But Volker Perthes,
the chairman of Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (the German Institute
for International and Security Affairs, which published the report
cited by Slaughter), seems to understand that hostility to further
European integration is incompatible with Germany’s own security.
Germany’s
willingness to play a greater role in a common foreign and defense
policy reflects a fundamental truth: the “dividing lines between
domestic and international affairs,” as Perthes puts it, “have become
increasingly blurred.” Exhibit A is the refugee crisis, which “demands
policy interventions in areas as diverse as defense, development aid,
European integration, domestic security, and social-welfare policy.”
However Jacek Rostowski,
a former finance minister and deputy prime minister of Poland, is
unimpressed. He goes even further than Koike, arguing that Germany’s
“misguided imposition of austerity on the eurozone has undermined
European political cohesion, thereby opening the door for Russian
revanchism and aggression.”
In
Rostowski’s view, US presidential candidate Donald Trump has a point in
accusing European NATO members of free-riding on the US. Only four
European NATO states meet the Alliance’s 2%-of-GDP target for defense
spending. One of the four, ironically, is Greece. By contrast, Germany’s
defense spending, at just 1.2% of GDP, falls far short of its
obligation. Rostowski doesn’t mince words: “The US should tell Germany –
in the same no-nonsense terms that Germany used with Greece – that it
cannot defer to the US for its security while undermining Western unity
to protect its taxpayers from possible intra-eurozone liabilities.”
Burden-Sharing German-Style
If
Germany and the eurozone countries are serious about resolving the euro
crisis and halting the EU’s unraveling, a more federal institutional
structure is needed, so that internal trade imbalances can be corrected
through obligatory transfers of resources from one part of the currency
union to another. Of course, Germany would have to contribute the most
to stabilization efforts, which is why it has resisted such moves in the
past.
Last year, however, Otmar Issing,
a founding ECB board member and chief economist, wrote that “Europe’s
current crisis has convinced many that existing institutional
arrangements are unsustainable,” and suggested that the absence of
“progress toward political unification” since the euro’s introduction
“may be about to change.” Brexit has certainly confirmed Issing’s
diagnosis, if not his forecast.
Issing
himself is highly skeptical of prospects for political integration:
“voters are far from enthusiastic about the prospect of ceding more
authority to Europe.” And, in the absence of “true political
unification,” any “transfer of fiscal competencies to the European
level” would imply “serious risks.” As a result, for the time being,
“political responsibility for higher transfer payments among countries
must remain with the national governments, controlled by national
parliaments and electorates.”
Political unification, too, carries risks. “The danger”, argues Hans-Werner Sinn
of Munich University and the Ifo Institute, is “that collective
decision-making bodies not only provide services that are useful to
everybody, but also may abuse their power to redistribute resources
among the participating countries.”
For
Sinn, this is not merely a matter of closing the EU’s infamous
“democratic deficit” – the supposed lack of accountability that played a
large part in the Brexit vote. (In fact, the most important decisions
at the European level are made in the European Council, which comprises
all of the – democratically elected – leaders of the member states.)
Rather, the problem for Sinn is that “[e]ven democratic bodies are not
immune” from temptation. “On the contrary, they make it possible for
majorities to exploit minorities.” This is why such “bodies invariably
need special rules to protect minorities, such as the requirement of
qualified majority voting or unanimous decision-making.”
President Merkel?
Sinn doesn’t say it, but his proposed constraints on political majorities are part and parcel of federalism. James agrees,
arguing that Germany “is uniquely suited to act as a model for Europe,
owing to its federal character, which is reflected in strong
constitutional guarantees of states’ rights.” And, before the Brexit
vote, Germany’s finance minister, Wolfgang Schäuble, had proposed a plan
for limited political union.
But Yanis Varoufakis,
a former finance minister of Greece, finds fault with Schäuble’s
proposal. “Schäuble,” he explains, “favors a formalized Eurogroup
(composed of the eurozone’s finance ministers), presided over by a
president who wields veto power – legitimized by a Euro Chamber
comprising parliamentarians from the eurozone member states – over
national budgets.” In exchange for giving up control over their national
budgets, Schäuble promised countries such as France and Italy a common
European budget that would partly fund unemployment and
deposit-insurance schemes.
Varoufakis
thinks that plan is too minimalist to work: “Nothing short of
macroeconomically significant institutional reforms will stabilize
Europe.” To get there, Varoufakis envisages a “pan-European democratic
alliance of citizens” that can “generate the groundswell needed for such
reforms to take root.”
A
movement of that type would be welcome, but it needs a strong leader.
Merkel, despite her current travails, can be that leader. Indeed, she
appears to be the only possible choice on the horizon. If Europe found
the will to push institutional reforms in the right direction, Merkel
could become the EU’s first elected president. But to generate the will
for the more integrated Europe that such a position would require, she
must overrule Schäuble.
And
she must do so soon. Another banking crisis is looming in Italy, where
Prime Minister Matteo Renzi’s government may not survive a referendum in
November on constitutional reform. As Renzi tries to stem growing
support for the populist Five Start Movement, which favors withdrawal
from the eurozone, he, like French President François Hollande, has held
firm against austerity.
The
emergence of an anti-austerity axis among Europe’s other large
economies, together with the UK’s departure, means that Europe will not
become more “German” anytime soon. The reality is that German-fostered
austerity has failed – and now Europe needs growth. For that to happen,
Germany must become more “European.” As George Soros has put it, the choice for Merkel, her government, and for Germany is straightforward: “lead or leave.”
Source: project-syndicate.org
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